Kubernetes powers modern infrastructure but with power comes complexity. That’s why tools like Komodor, Groundcover, and Devtron promise “instant visibility” and “effortless troubleshooting.”
The catch? They all ask the same thing: install our agent inside your cluster and all done, right!
It feels harmless. One helm install, and suddenly you have sleek dashboards and alerts. But from a security point of view, this convenience could be your biggest vulnerability.
In this post, we’ll break down:
- Why Kubernetes agents increase your attack surface
- How agents consume CPU and memory resources
- The dangers of privileged RBAC and eBPF access
- The unanswered question: who owns your data, and where is it stored?
- Safer alternatives for Kubernetes observability
Why Kubernetes Agents Are a Security Risk
Every Kubernetes security guide preaches the same thing: least privilege. But agents break that rule.
Agents often:
- Run as privileged Pods
- Request cluster-wide RBAC permissions
- Access Pods, Secrets, ConfigMaps, and CRDs
- Use kernel-level features like eBPF, bypassing container boundaries
If the vendor’s image is compromised or their pipeline attacked, your entire cluster could be at risk. You’ve effectively handed the keys to your kingdom to a third party.
If you can run eBPF programs in the kernel, you can see and control almost everything on the host, so you can do all of this and more
- Monitoring network connections and packet contents
- Tracing every system call by any process
- Intercepting file I/O and process execution
- Collecting sensitive data like passwords, API tokens, or database queries
- Even altering kernel behavior if the verifier is bypassed or a vulnerability exists
In other words, running an eBPF-based agent is equivalent to giving a vendor root-level access to your nodes.
And while the Linux kernel has a verifier to limit unsafe eBPF programs, it’s not bulletproof.
- Kernel CVEs tied to eBPF have been reported in recent years.
- Researchers have demonstrated bypasses to run malicious payloads.
- eBPF programs are persistent until explicitly removed — making them attractive for attackers.
So while marketing pages say “eBPF is safe and secure”, security researchers caution the opposite: eBPF should be treated as a privileged, high-risk capability, not a freebie.
It seems to me that this trade off is just not worthy, whatever the company and it does not matter how many ISO of SOC they have. This is too much…
The Privilege Escalation Problem
Security in Kubernetes depends on limiting who can do what. Agents, however, often need broad visibility.
- eBPF-based agents (like Groundcover’s) can monitor system calls and network traffic — but that same access could be abused to snoop or tamper.
- Komodor’s agent needs to watch events and resource changes across the cluster, which means wide permissions.
- Devtron, being a CI/CD platform, integrates deeply with pipelines and deployments — increasing the blast radius of any compromise.
Bottom line: Many of these agents have more privileges than your developers. That’s a massive risk. What happens if they get hack, now a hacker can do God damage. Is like ArgoCd get compromise, you can literally run anythin on the cluster.
Who Knows About Your Data?
Vendors often reassure customers:
“We don’t transfer PII or sensitive data. You control what’s uploaded.”
Yeah right, ask AWS,Facebook,Alibaba, come on!
But the details matter:
- What logs, traces, and events actually leave your cluster?
- Where are they stored — US, EU, APAC?
- How long are they retained?
- Who inside the vendor company can access them?
Even a single Pod log line could contain emails, API keys, or internal architecture details. Under GDPR, HIPAA, or PCI DSS, that’s sensitive data.
If you don’t have clear answers, you don’t control your risk.
The Hidden Cost: CPU and Memory
Marketing pages love to say “near-zero overhead.” But in reality:
- Agents process logs, metrics, and traces → CPU cycles
- They buffer data → Memory usage
- They export telemetry → Network bandwidth
At scale, that adds up. I’ve seen clusters where observability agents consumed 10–15% of node resources — resources stolen from production workloads.
Your customers don’t care if Groundcover’s eBPF probe is efficient. They care that your app is slow.
Real-World Complaints
Let’s be clear: no public “Komodor hack” or “Groundcover breach” has made headlines. But user feedback shows cracks in the story.
- Komodor: Reddit users criticized it for changes that felt like “bait-and-switch,” with some preferring agentless alternatives like K8Studio.
- Groundcover: Built on eBPF, which researchers warn can itself be a security risk due to kernel CVEs and lack of anti-tamper guarantees.
- Devtron: Users report Helm chart deployment issues, proving that complexity in-cluster multiplies misconfigurations.
The pattern is clear: agents increase trust boundaries and complexity.
Safer Alternatives
If you still need observability, consider these approaches:
- Agentless monitoring: Use Kubernetes APIs, audit logs, or external collectors that don’t require privileged in-cluster agents.
- Tighter RBAC: Never apply the default vendor ClusterRole blindly. Scope permissions carefully.
- Namespace & network isolation: Run agents in their own namespace with strict policies. Reduce the blast radius.
- Data governance: Demand transparency from vendors: where data is stored, how it’s encrypted, how long it lives.
- Resource monitoring: Track agent CPU/memory usage. Don’t assume “minimal overhead” means safe at scale.
- Zero trust mindset: Treat vendor agents like untrusted third-party code. Design defenses accordingly.
The Uncomfortable Truth
Vendors pitch their agents as “lightweight passengers.” But in reality, they’re drivers inside your cluster. They see everything. They consume resources. They hold powerful privileges.
The convenience is real. But so are the risks.
Before installing yet another agent, ask yourself:
- Do I know what permissions it actually has?
- Do I know exactly what data leaves my cluster?
- Do I know how much CPU and memory it consumes?
- Do I trust this vendor more than I trust my own team?
If you hesitate on any of those, maybe the safest agent is no agent at all.
K8Studio: Visibility Without Agents
Most Kubernetes troubleshooting platforms — Komodor, Groundcover, Devtron — work by installing agents directly inside your cluster. That means more Pods, more RBAC permissions, and sometimes even kernel-level eBPF probes.
K8Studio takes a completely different approach.
- It’s a client application, not an in-cluster service.
- You don’t deploy DaemonSets, sidecars, or privileged Pods.
- Your cluster stays clean — no extra components competing for CPU or memory.
- There’s no risk of a vendor agent being compromised and escalating privileges.
- Your cluster’s sensitive data never leaves your environment.
Because K8Studio runs externally, it interacts with your cluster via the standard Kubernetes API, respecting the same boundaries you already enforce. That means you get the benefits of a powerful troubleshooting toolkit without the security baggage of embedding someone else’s code in your production workloads.
Key Takeaway
Kubernetes agents aren’t evil. Tools like Komodor, Groundcover, and Devtron can deliver real value. But they come at a cost: security exposure, data risk, and resource overhead.
Don’t install them blindly. Audit, question, and contain them. Because the easiest way to lose control of your cluster… is to give it away yourself.